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Abstract—One of the recognized principal issues brought along
by the steadfast migration towards power electronic interfaced
energy sources is the loss of rotational inertia. In conventional
power systems, the inertia of the synchronous machines plays
a crucial role in safeguarding against any drastic variations
in frequency by acting as a buffer in the event of large and
sudden power generation-demand imbalances. In future power
electronic-based power systems, the same role can be played by
strategically located virtual inertia devices. However, the question
looms large as to how the system operators would procure and
pay for these devices. In this article, we propose a market
mechanism inspired by the ancillary service markets in power
supply. We consider a linear network-reduced power system
model along with a robust H2 performance metric penalizing
the worst-case primary control effort. With a social welfare
maximization problem for the system operator as a benchmark,
we construct a market mechanism in which bids are invited from
agents providing virtual inertia, who in turn are compensated via
a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payment rule. The resulting mechanism
ensures truthful bidding to be the dominant bidding strategy and
guarantees non-negative payoffs for the agents. A three-region
case study is considered in simulations, and a comparison with
a regulatory approach to the same problem is presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
The significance of the role that the inertia of large rotating
synchronous machines played in conventional power grids has
come to the fore once again. There has been a concerted
effort to phase out fossil fuel-based generation in favour of
power electronic interfaced solar and wind-based renewable
generation. However, such a transition has been accompanied
by a rise in the instances of reported grid frequency violations
[1]. The low system inertia is ill-equipped to arrest large
frequency swings caused by power imbalances. Among the
numerous attempts carried out to address this issue of loss of
inertia, a considerable focus is being directed at virtual inertia
emulation. The key feature of such a scheme is mimicking the
effect that the rotational inertia in traditional generation had on
the grid. This is achieved through advanced control strategies
and state-of-the-art power electronic devices [2]–[6]. Previ-
ously, studies have been conducted [7]–[12] to ascertain the
impact of spatial arrangement of these virtual inertia devices.
A performance metric accounting for frequency violations
due to possible disturbances is adopted for this purpose. The
location of these devices across the grid significantly alters the
system response to disturbances, and the optimal placement is
found to heavily depend on the expected disturbance profile of
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the fluctuations that the grid may experience [7]. However, the
associated economics of such an integration has not received
adequate attention. The pricing and payment of synchronous
inertia find a mention in [13]. The Australian Energy Market
Commission security market report [14] recommends virtual
inertia provision by transmission operators and introducing
market-sourcing mechanisms to this end.
The objective of this study is to identify potential conflicts
arising due to the interaction between multiple non-cooperative
stakeholders, e.g., end-consumers, transmission system oper-
ators, renewable energy source providers, etc., and propose
a plausible solution which safeguards individual interests.
To this end, the problems of provisioning of virtual inertia
units and the affiliated payment architecture are considered
within the framework of ancillary-service markets coupled
with auction theory. Pricing as an instrument to assist fre-
quency regulation is not new, having being discussed in [15].
Numerous works [16]–[18] have weighed-in on markets for
regulation in power systems. The authors in [19], [20] consider
variants of the
problem of mechanism design for electricity markets, while
[21] discusses a game-theoretic characterization of market
power in energy markets. Among the several market mecha-
nisms, energy markets based on the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism [22]–[24] have been previously
explored in [25]–[27]. Such a mechanism maximizes a pre-
defined global cost (e.g., social welfare of all stakeholders),
while allowing individual agents to operate as per their private
interests. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is a
lack of market design for virtual inertia provision to ensure
the system dynamical performance.
Contributions: The contributions of this paper are as fol-
lows. We construct and propose a framework wherein the
procurement and pricing of virtual inertia across the power
network, coupled with their effect on system performance is
reformulated as an H2 system norm optimization problem. To
this end, we present two approaches: the centralized problem
formulation– which is considered as an efficiency benchmark
and a market-based approach. Both these constructions cater
to long-term planning as well as the day-ahead or the real-time
(e.g., 5 minute) procurement scenarios. Though the centralized
approach seems appealing due to its efficiency, it is quite
idealistic, as all participating agents need to report their cost
curves to the system operator. This exposes us to the concern
of inflated reporting of cost curves, which often leads to unjus-
tified profits for the agents. To overcome these shortcomings,
we adopt the VCG framework from mechanism design as the
foundation of our proposed market mechanism. This mech-
anism incentivizes the agents to participate (by guaranteeing
non-negative payoffs) and to report their true cost curves–as
the optimal bidding strategies. We also recover the efficiency
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of our benchmark solution, as the two procurement problems
coincide, maximizing a social welfare objective. Though VCG
has been well-studied, our mechanism is rendered novel due to
the nature of the problem we address. Our min-max problem
setup with infinite-dimensional coupling constraint (an LTI
system) is a non-trivial example for applying VCG. The social
welfare objective considered in this paper is a linear combina-
tion of costs accounting for the worst-case post-fault dynamic
response of the power network and the costs of procuring
virtual inertia. Moreover, because of the special structure of
the problem, the VCG mechanism applied to our problem is
proved to be individual rational i.e., every market participant
is guaranteed to receive non-negative net revenue. Our analytic
results rest on a deliberately stylized power system model
and an H2 frequency performance criterion, though they can
be extended (numerically) to more detailed models and other
performance indices as long as the underlying optimization
problems can be solved efficiently. Finally, as the value of
inertia and procurement thereof, is location-dependent, we
show that this non-homogeneity prevents the existence of a
global price for virtual inertia. Moreover, even with a large
number of agents, it becomes critical to have them reveal the
true cost and they do not possess enough market power unless
they collude.
The remainder of this section introduces some notation.
Section II provides a background on the problem by revis-
iting some previously established results on H2 norm based
coherency metrics. Section III introduces the different costs
associated with virtual inertia and provides a benchmark
procurement problem. Such a problem admits a solution which
maximizes a measure of social welfare. Section IV presents an
efficient market-based setup for inertia procurement. Section
V presents a case study and simulations on a three-region
network, where we compare the market-based and classic
regulatory approaches. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Notation: We denote the n-dimensional vectors of all
ones and zeros by 1n and 0n. Given an index set I with
cardinality |I| and a real-valued array {x1, . . . , x|I|}, we
denote by x ∈ R|I| the vector obtained by stacking the scalars
xi and by diag{xi} the associated diagonal matrix. The vector
ei is the i-th vector of the canonical basis for Rn.
II. PROBLEM BACKGROUND
In this section, we present our power system model and
integral-quadratic H2 performance criterion for frequency
stability. We consider a power system model consisting of
network-reduced swing equations accounting for the dynamics
of synchronous machines and virtual inertia devices as in [7]–
[10]. This coarse-grain model for the power system frequency
dynamics together with the H2 metric allows us to derive
our market mechanism in an analytic and insightful fashion.
We remark that the results in this paper hold equally true
when considering higher-order models of synchronous ma-
chines including governor dynamics, inertia-emulating power
converters as in [12], and also other performance metrics [9]–
[11] as long as the underlying optimization problems can be
solved efficiently.
A. System Modeling
We consider a power network modeled by an underlying
graph with nodes (buses) V = {1, . . . , n} and edges (trans-
mission lines) E ⊆ V × V . Next, a small-signal version of
a network-reduced power system model [28] is considered,
where passive loads are modeled as constant impedances
and eliminated via Kron reduction [29], and the network is
reduced to the sources i ∈ {1,. . . , n} with linearized dynamics.
The assumptions of identical unit voltage magnitudes, purely
inductive lines, and a small signal approximation [28] result
in
miθ¨i + diθ˙i = pin,i −
∑
{i,j}∈E
bij(θi − θj), ∀ i, (1)
where pin,i refers to the net (i.e., electrical and mechanical)
nodal power input, bij ≥ 0 is the inverse of the reactance
between nodes {i, j} ∈ E . If bus i only hosts a single
synchronous machine, then (1) describes the electromechanical
swing dynamics for the generator rotor angle θi [28], mi > 0
is the generator’s rotational inertia, and di > 0 accounts for
frequency damping or primary speed droop control (neglecting
ramping limits).
The renewable energy sources interfaced via power elec-
tronic inverters [30] are also compatible with this setup.
For such an interconnection, θi is the voltage phase angle,
di > 0 is the droop control coefficient, and mi > 0 either
accounts for power measurement time constant [31], or arises
from virtual inertia emulation through a dedicated controlled
device [2]–[4], or is simply a control gain [32]. Finally, the
dynamics (1) may also arise from frequency-dependent or
actively controlled frequency-responsive loads [33]. In general,
each bus i may host an ensemble of these devices, and the
quantities mi, di reflect their aggregate behavior.
We wish to characterize the response of the interconnected
system to disturbances in the nodal power injections, possi-
bly representing faults, disconnection of loads or generators,
intermittent demand, or fluctuating power generation from
renewable sources as in [7]–[12], [34]. To do so, we consider
the linear power system model (1) driven by the inputs pin,i
parametrized as pin,i = pii
1
2 ηi. In this parametrization, ηi is a
normalized disturbance, and the diagonal matrix Π = diag{pii}
encodes the information about the strength of the disturbance
at different buses, and therefore, describes also the location of
the disturbance. We can obtain the state-space model for this
linearized system as[
θ˙
ω˙
]
=
[
0 I
−M−1L −M−1D
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= A
[
θ
ω
]
+
[
0
M−1Π1/2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= B
η,
where M = diag{mi} and D = diag{di} are the diago-
nal matrices of inertia and damping/droop coefficients, and
L ∈ Rn×n is the symmetric network susceptance matrix. The
states x = (θ, ω) ∈ R2n are the stacked vectors of angles
and frequencies (deviations from the nominal values). Note
that A[1>n 0
>
n ]
> = 02n and thus, [1>n 0
>
n ]
> is the right
eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue zero. To gauge
the robustness of a power system to disturbances, we study
generalized energy functions as metrics [12], e.g., a quadratic
function expressed as the time-integral∑
i
∫ ∞
0
yi(t)>yi(t) dt =
∑
i
∫ ∞
0
[C x(t)
i
]>[C x(t)]i dt ,
(2)
where yi(t) = C x(t)i is the corresponding output for an input
ui(t). Note that by construction, the matrix C is such that
C[1>n 0
>
n ]
> = 02n.1
The above performance metric can be interpreted as the
energy amplification of the output y (resp., its steady-state total
variance) for impulsive disturbances η (resp., unit variance
white noise in a stochastic setting) and is commonly referred
to as the squared H2 norm. The suitability of this metric to
describe the stability and robustness of the system post fault
is discussed in [7], [12].
B. H2 norm calculation
In this subsection, we recall a tractable approach for com-
puting the energy metric presented in the previous subsection.
Lemma 1. (H2 norm via observability Gramian) Con-
sider the state-space system G(A,B,C) defined above, with
A[1>n 0
>
n ]
> = C[1>n 0
>
n ]
> = 02n. The H2 norm, Y(m,pi) is
given by
‖G‖22 = Y(m,pi) = Trace(B>PB) , (3)
where Q = C>C, P ∈ R2n×2n is the observability Gramian,
uniquely defined by the following Lyapunov equation and an
additional constraint:
PA+A>P +Q = 0 , (4)
P [1>n 0
>
n ]
> = 02n . (5)
It is known that the existence of the solution to (4) depends
on the positive semi-definiteness of Q. Furthermore, from [7],
we conclude that the solution P is unique under the constraint
(5). This result generalizes the uniqueness of P , as in [7], to
any positive semidefinite matrix Q. Lemma 1 allows us to
analyze the generalized energy function (2) via an elegant H2
norm optimization problem.
C. Virtual inertia and post-fault behavior
The minimization of Y(m,pi) through suitable choice of
inertia coefficients mi, attenuates the energy amplifications
due to disturbances. We stress here that as the H2 norm is
a function of both the spatial distribution of the inertia m in
the grid and the location and strengths of the disturbances pi
(through the input matrix B and through the cost function C),
the effect of the location also impacts the market mechanism.
• Generalised energy function – The performance metric
(2) computed in (3)-(5) as Y(m,pi) is generally non-convex
in the inertia variable m (cf. [7]). This is troublesome as
it significantly complicates the analysis and study of the
consequences of loss in synchronous inertia in large-scale
power systems.
1As the system matrix is not Hurwitz, this choice ensures that the uncon-
trollable mode of A is also unobservable from C.
A meaningful metric which singles out the effect of inertia
on the post-fault frequency response is desirable in order
to quantify and mitigate any obstacles arising due to the
loss in synchronous inertia. To tackle these two concerns
simultaneously, we consider the output y(t) = D1/2ω(t) as
the cost in (2). This yields
YD(m,pi) =
∑
i
∫ ∞
0
[ω(t)>Dω(t)]i dt , (6)
which penalizes the frequency excursions at each node via
the primary control effort dω in (1) for disturbances at all
inputs ui(t). This cost function is also justified from a system
operator’s viewpoint as significant resources are employed to
contain frequency violations through droop control to restore
frequency stability, which is effectively captured here. We
note that a penalty on primary control effort is also (and
especially) meaningful when considering more detailed higher-
order power system models [12] where the optimal control
strategy trades-off already existing droop control and addi-
tional costly inertia emulation.
• Primary Control Effort – The performance metric
YD(m,pi) in (6), further, as a special case, admits a closed-
form expression of the squared H2 norm via Lemma 1 which
is convex in the inertia variable m, i.e.,
‖G‖22 = YD(m,pi) =
∑
i
pii
mi
, (7)
where pii, mi are the disturbance strength, inertia at node
i respectively. Note that the performance metric is linear in
the disturbance strengths pii. We refer the reader to [7] for a
detailed proof.
As discussed in Section II-A, Π encodes the specific loca-
tion of a disturbance besides the strength. However, as grid
specifications necessitate performance guarantees against all
possible contingencies, it is appropriate to consider a robust
performance metric accounting for the worst-case disturbance.
We can incorporate such worst-case requirements by exploit-
ing the linearity of the performance metric (7) in pi. We
denote by P , the set collecting all the possibly occurring
disturbances (available from historical data, or forecasts). As
a representative, we consider the following normalized set for
the rest of the paper
P : pi ∈ Rn+, 1Tnpi ≤ pitot. (8)
This set P is a proxy for a set of bounded energy disturbances.
Let Γ(m) be the worst-case performance, over the set of
normalized disturbances in P , i.e.,
Γ(m) = max
pi∈P
YD(m,pi). (9)
As YD(m,pi) is linear in pi, the maximization problem (9) can
be reformulated as a tractable minimization problem, which
for the primary control effort (7) is given by
Γ(m) =
{
min
ρ≥0
pitot ρ
subject to m−1i − ρ ≤ 0 , ∀ i ,
(10a)
(10b)
where ρ is the dual multiplier associated with the inequality
budget constraint (8) on the disturbances.
• Convex Upper-bounds for general cost functions –
As we observed in (7), the objective is convex in the inertia
variable m, but this is not true for any general output matrix
C. However, it is possible to obtain an upper-bound on the
generalised energy function which is convex in m, as shown
below in Remark 1.
Remark 1 (Convex upper-bound). For generic performance
metrics (2), with an output matrix partitioned as C =
blkdiag(C1, diag(C2)), a convex (in m) upper bound is [7]
Y(m,pi) ≤ pi · 1
2d
{
Trace(L†Q1) +
n∑
i=1
(Q2)i
mi
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= Ub(m)
,
where, pi = maxi{pii}, d = mini{di}, L† is the pseudo-
inverse of the network Laplacian L, and the matrix Q =
C>C = blkdiag(Q1, Q2). For the disturbance set P in (8), the
worst-case upper-bound Ub(m) on the performance Y(m,pi)
in terms of the inertia variable m is given by
U(m) = max
pi∈P
pi Ub(m) = pitot Ub(m).
Alternatively, this bound can be expressed as
U(m) =
 minρ≥0 pitot ρsubject to Ub(m)− ρ ≤ 0 .
We note the striking similarity and parallels in the structures
of U(m) and (10). In the subsequent sections we shall focus
on the primary control effort for our analyses. However,
we remark that this choice is not particularly restrictive, as
investigating a convex upper bound (as in Remark 1) for
generic cost functions (2) leads to a comparable analyses and
analogous results– due to convexity in the inertia variable m.
III. CENTRALIZED PLANNING PROBLEM FOR INERTIA
In this section, we motivate the inertia planning problem
from the system operator’s context. Consider a setting, wherein
the system operator acquires virtual inertia units from multiple
agents, with the provision of more than one agent per bus
(or node). A possible regulatory solution involves sourcing
units proportional to their capacity from each agent. This
may, however, be uneconomical as virtual inertia units may
be dissimilar based on the underlying technology and may
not have identical costs. In order to make a more informed
choice, it is, therefore, necessary to consider the costs entailed
for virtual inertia provision by these units.
The grid operator needs safeguarding against the worst-
case limits [35] on ‖ω˙(t)‖∞. Thus, a significant virtual inertia
support in terms of large power injections for short durations of
time post-fault is necessary to offset large frequency violations
and arrest the rate of change of frequency ω˙. We recall from
(1) that the power injected by virtual inertia devices during
the initial post-fault transient is given by pinj ∝ ‖mω˙(t)‖∞.
As such a service of providing high peak-power is not usually
provided by the existing converters, it requires a dedicated
oversized power converter interface.
A previous study [36] considered the problem of economic
evaluation along with the design aspects of virtual inertia
providing devices. The cost for provision of peak power was
revealed as the overriding factor in determining the overall cost
for such devices. Furthermore, it was proposed the normalised
cost of physical inertia as a trading unit, rendering all the mon-
etary costs proportional to m. In addition, agents would also
incur some costs towards the maintenance of these resources
over their lifetime. Together, all these contribute to the net cost
of providing virtual inertia as a service. We consider c(m), a
convex non-decreasing function to account for the lumped cost
of m.
The system operator, now equipped with the true cost infor-
mation, determines the virtual inertia allocation by optimizing
system performance in an economical manner. Mathematically,
this translates to solving the following optimization problem
min
µ
γ Γ(m(µ)) +
∑
k∈A
ck(µk) (11a)
subject to 0 ≤ µk ≤ µk, ∀ k, (11b)
where, Γ(m) is the worst-case performance metric as in (10),
A = A1∪ . . .∪An, Ai is the total number of agents at node i,
is the total number of agents, µk is the virtual inertia obtained
from agent k, and γ > 0 trades-off the coherency metric and
the economic costs. We further note that m(µ) can be broken
down as
mi = m
0
i +
∑
k∈Ai
µk, ∀ i, (12)
where, m0 is the stacked vector of existing/residual (after the
synchronous machines are replaced) inertia at the nodes and
µk is the procured virtual inertia from each agent k. We model
the capacity constraints of each agent via (11b), where µk
is the maximum inertia procurement capacity from agent k.
This set up is schematically represented in Figure 12. In the
following, we use µ ∈ M as a shorthand for the constraints
encoded in (11b).
System Operator
nodes
bids bk(µk)
costs ck(µk)
capacity µk
A1 An
k
Fig. 1: A schematic representing the operator-agent interaction for
the centralised and market-based mechanism design and highlighting
the richness of the problem under consideration. We depict different
nodes Ai through rectangular boxes and their non-homogeneity in the
value of inertia at these nodes through different colors. The number
of circles in each rectangle indicate the number of agents, the color
their dissimilarities and the radii of the circles, their inertia capacities.
The solution to (11) is the allocation that maximizes the so-
cial welfare, by virtue of minimizing the worst-case coherency
2For the centralised problem which is considered a benchmark, the agents
only provide the costs c(µk) and not the bids b(µk).
metric (10) and the cost of virtual inertia. Such an allocation
is inherently efficient and constitutes the benchmark solution
to the virtual inertia procurement problem. The centralized
problem (11) and the variations thereof have been studied in
[7], [9], [12]. However, in liberalized energy markets, the cost
functions ck(µk) are private information of each agent and
therefore the system operator can not directly solve (11). We
consider such a framework in the next section.
Remark 2 (Planning and day-ahead scenarios). Both the
centralized inertia procurement problem (11) and the market-
based approach (that we propose in Section IV) can be consid-
ered on two operational time-scales. If analyzed in a long-term
planning framework, virtual inertia is predominantly employed
to counteract the ill-effects of integrating renewables, coupled
with a planned phasing-out of synchronous machines. As the
costs are biased towards high peak-power devices, a market
is needed to incentivise investment and installation of such
devices. On the other hand, in a day-ahead scenario, virtual
inertia is deployed for instantaneous frequency support in case
of time-varying inertia profiles [8], incidental re-dispatches,
and anticipated fluctuations. This market can be employed at
different time-scales, including real-time (e.g. 5 mins).
IV. A MARKET MECHANISM FOR INERTIA
In this section, we consider a market-based procurement
approach, inspired by ancillary service markets. In such a set-
ting, the power system regulator devises a market mechanism–
where the system operator invites bids for virtual inertia in lieu
of a fair compensation to the agents providing the service. The
additional burden is eventually borne by the end consumers.
The objectives that govern the design of such a mechanism are:
safeguard against the agents benefiting from reporting inflated
bids; ensure that the resulting payments incentivize agents to
participate in the auction and assure non-negative returns; and
guarantee the efficiency of the benchmark centralized planning
problem discussed in Section III.
A. Overview and Preliminaries: Mechanism Design
We consider a mechanism design approach to design an
auction for the system operator to procure virtual inertia at
the buses. Specifically, each agent with its private cost function
ck(·) is one agent. The system operator
(1) collects a bid bk(·) from each agent k,
(2) determines an allocation/procurement µk(b), and
(3) sets the payment pk(b) for each agent k.
Here, b = (b1, . . . , bn) are the collected bids, and we alter-
natively use the notation (bk, b−k) to denote b. Each agent k
aims to choose its bidding curve bk(µk) strategically, in order
to maximize individual utility, which is a measure of profit.
The utility function uk, is computed as the difference between
the payment and the investment costs, i.e., the utility evaluated
when µk inertia units are provided by agent k at a bid bk is
given by
uk(bk, b−k) = pk(bk, b−k)− ck(µk(bk, b−k)), (13)
and depends also on all other agents’ bids.
Different mechanism design approaches differ on the types
of bids, allocation rule, and payment rule. Due to the Reve-
lation Principle, in this paper, we only consider direct mech-
anism design, meaning that the bids bk are the same type of
cost functions ck. In the following, we formalize a few of these
notions via game-theoretic definitions [37] before proceeding
to the main results.
• Nash equilibrium: In a non-cooperative game theoretic
setting, a Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies for the players,
such that a unilateral deviation by any participant (strategies
of other players unchanged) does not result in any gain in the
payoff. For the game under consideration, this translates to a
set of bids (b?1, . . . , b
?
n) being a Nash equilibrium, if for all
agents k, the utility uk(bk, b−k) satisfies
uk(b
?
k, b
?
−k) ≥ uk(bk, b?−k), ∀ bk,
where the bids bk, b−k are the bids of agent k and other agents
excluding k, respectively.
• Dominant strategy: A strategy for any player is said to
be dominant, if irrespective of the strategies of other players,
the payoff is larger than any other of its strategies. This is a
stronger result than a Nash equilibrium strategy, as it is alien
to the strategies of other players.
For the game considered here, this translates to a bid b?k being
dominant for agent k, if the utility is maximized, i.e.,
uk(b
?
k, b−k) ≥ uk(bk, b−k), ∀ b−k, bk.
• Incentive-compatibility: A mechanism is said to be
incentive-compatible if every player maximizes its payoff by
bidding true costs bk = ck, i.e.,
uk(ck, b−k) ≥ uk(bk, b−k), ∀ b−k, bk.
Observe that an incentive-compatible mechanism results in a
dominant strategy (thus, also a Nash equilibrium) with truthful
bids b?k = ck.
• Mechanism Structure: From a mechanism design view-
point, the key characteristics of the proposed market mecha-
nism are as follows. The “type space" corresponds to the set
of convex, non-decreasing cost curves ck(µk) which is the
private information of each agent k. The “message space" is
the set of non-decreasing, convex bidding curves bk(µk) such
that bk(0) = 0 for each agent k. The mechanism thus designed
is a direct mechanism from the Revelation Principle.
B. VCG Market Mechanism
The auction theory literature is rich with mechanisms pro-
posed to incentivize the participation of agents while pro-
hibiting exorbitant bidding. A particularly popular one, which
respects both the requirements, is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism [22]–[24]. In this paper, we assume that
the regulator adopts this mechanism as a possible approach.
The system operator sets up an auction to procure virtual
inertia for buses i ∈ V . We denote by k ∈ A, the different
agents who participate in the auction (see Figure 1). Each
agent simultaneously submits non-decreasing and convex bid-
ding curves bk(µk) together with the margins on the maximum
µk virtual inertia that can be provided.
The system operator instead of (11), determines the alloca-
tion vector µVCG, for individual bids bk(µk) for each agent k,
by solving the optimization problem
µVCG(b) := arg min
µ∈M
γ Γ(m(µ)) +
∑
k∈A
bk(µk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:= B(µ, b)
. (14)
We recall from (10) that Γ(m(µ)) is convex in m (therefore,
also convex in µ). The objective B(µ, b) being convex in
the µ’s, admits an optimal allocation which is unique and
concurrently minimizes the worst-case coherency metric (10),
while choosing the most economical bids.
The agents k ∈ A receive a commensurate compensation
for the virtual inertia µk they provide, according to the
VCG payment rule (16). The knowledge of the underlying
mechanism is assumed to be known a priori to both the
operator and agents. The payment made to agent k translates
to its externality, i.e., the difference of the system costs when
agent k is absent from the auction and the cost when agent
k’s contribution is excluded.
Let µVCG-k be the vector of optimal allocations of agents,
when agent k abstains from the auction. This corresponds to
the solution of the same optimization problem (14), with the
same bids, however, with the constraint set M−k := M ∩
(µk = 0), accounting for the absence of k, i.e.,
µVCG-k(b) := arg min
µ∈M−k
B(µ, b). (15)
The payment pVCGk to agent k is computed as
pVCGk =
{
B(µVCG-k, b)
}
−
{
B(µVCG, b)− bk(µVCGk )
}
, (16)
where we recall that µVCG and µVCG-k are defined in (14) and
(15) respectively.
The market mechanism is completely defined by the map
that dictates the allocations µk and the payments pk, given
the bids bk collected from the agents. Figure 2 illustrates
the operator-agent mechanism, where we make the allocations
µ(b) and the payments p(b) explicit functions of the bids.
System Operator
min
µ∈M
max
pi∈P
γ Y(m(µ), pi) +
∑
k∈A
bk(µk)
↑ bid
bk(µk)
←→
mechanism design
(Regulator)
↓ payment,
allocation
(pVCGk , µ
VCG
k )
Individual Agent
max
bk
pVCGk (bk, b−k)− ck(µVCGk )︸ ︷︷ ︸
= uk(bk, b−k)
(17)
Fig. 2: Schematic representing the operator-agent mechanism through
a regulator proposed mechanism design.
For the market setup in Figure 2, we investigate suitable
bidding strategies for the agents to maximize their utilities, in
the theorem below. A mechanism additionally ensuring non-
negative utilities is said to be individually rational.
Theorem 1. (VCG-based inertia auction) Consider the mar-
ket setup described in Section IV-B, defined by the allocation
function µVCG in terms of the bids (14) and the payment
function pVCG in (16). Then for every agent k,
(i) the VCG mechanism is incentive-compatible,
(ii) the utilities of the agents and payments made to the agents
are non-negative,
(iii) and the allocation µVCG(c) is efficient, i.e., solves the
social welfare maximization problem (11).
Proof. Please refer to the Appendix.
Theorem 1 establishes that under the framework proposed
in Figure 2, the agents maximize their respective utilities
by bidding their true cost functions. Such a characteristic is
desirable in order to prevent agents from accumulating profits
by reporting inflated bids. We wish to highlight that this
theorem adapts and extends the original VCG results to more
complex min-max objectives with dynamic coupling (an H2
norm setting) to arrive at a payment scheme for virtual inertia.
In addition, the proof also helps us to reflect on the assump-
tions made to arrive at the claimed result. We highlight that
primarily, we relied on the convexity of the performance metric
(7) (Section II. C) and the convexity of the bids (Section IV.
A) in the inertia variable m(µ). On inspection, the proof relies
on the ability to compute a global optimum of the combined
cost function B(µ, b). When considering large-scale non-linear
power system models, computing the local minima for such
a large dimensional problem is fairly easy, however it is very
hard to compute the global minimum (even if it exists). As
the VCG-based payments rely on recomputing the objective
without the agents’ contribution, it can be visualised that the
numerically computed optimizer could converge to any of the
multiple local minima (depending on the solver, initialisation,
etc.) and therefore could have varied objective values at
these minimizers. Under such scenarios, non-negativity of
the utility function cannot be assumed or proved. Therefore,
these assumptions can be relaxed if global minimum can be
computed explicitly or numerically.
Remark 3 (Alternate problem formulation). The planning
problem (11) can alternatively be posed as– minimizing costs
subject to meeting certain performance guarantees. In such a
framework, the optimization problem translates to
min
µ∈M
∑
k∈A
ck(µk) (18a)
subject to Γ(m(µ)) ≤ Γ (18b)
where, Γ is a pre-specified performance guarantee which the
system operator desires to meet. Observe that upon dualizing
the constraint (18b) with a Lagrange multiplier γ, we obtain
max
γ≥0
{
−γ Γ + min
µ∈M
∑
k∈A
ck(µk) + γ Γ(m(µ))
}
. (19)
The inner minimization problem corresponds to the original
problem formulation (11). The outer maximization problem,
on the other hand, is a tractable scalar optimization problem
that can be solved via standard iterative procedures. As the
optimal bidding strategy has been shown to be independent of
γ in Theorem 1, the same bids can be used in all iterations of
the outer maximization problem.
Remark 4 (Generality of the result). Although we discuss
a particular instance based on a coarse-grain swing equation
model and an H2 performance metric here, Theorem 1 also
holds true for more general system models such as the non-
linear high-fidelity South East Australian system [38], as long
as the arg min of the expressions (14), (15) can be evaluated
efficiently.
V. NUMERICAL CASE STUDY
In this section, we present a few illustrations which support
the preceding discussions on the centralized planning problem
and the market-based auction mechanism. A 12-bus case study
depicted in Figure 3 is considered. The system parameters are
based on a modified two-region system from [33, Example
12.6] with an additional third region, as introduced in [10].
We assume that each node is enabled to receive virtual inertia
contributions from a number of dissimilar agents.
A. Simulation setup
We examine the alternate formulation presented in Remark 3
for the case study in Figure 3. This setup enables us to
impose guarantees on the worst-case performance via (18b).
Further, we note that the constraint (18b) requires solving
a maximization problem over the disturbance set (8). This
can however be circumvented by rewriting the maximization
inequality as a set of inequality constraints. We express (18b)
from (7), (9) as
max
pi
{∑
i
pii
mi
}
≤ Γ (20a)
subject to pii ≥ 0, ∀ i (20b)
1Tnpi ≤ pitot. (20c)
The linearity of (20a) in pi dictates that the maximum can
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Fig. 3: A 12 bus three-region test case, grid parameters as in [12].
be obtained by evaluating the objective at the vertices of the
polytope given by (20b)–(20c), i.e., (20) is equivalent to the
set of inequality constraints given by
pitot ≤ Γ ·mi, ∀ i. (21)
The resulting set of constraints from (21) is linear in the
decision variables µ and can be directly incorporated in the
optimization problem (19). For the purpose of simulations, we
choose a non-trivial performance guarantee Γ = 0.29. This
choice of Γ requires an additional virtual inertia allocation at
the buses labeled 2, 4, 8, 12 only, as the other buses by virtue
of m0 already have sufficient inertia capability based on (21)
to meet this constraint specification.
B. Simulation results
The design of the market facilitates virtual inertia at
each bus to be contributed by a number of agents. In
our case study, we consider 3, 7, 3, 2 agents connected
to buses numbered 2, 4, 8, 12 respectively, and label these
as (2a, . . . , 2c), (4a, . . . , 4g), (8a, . . . , 8c), (12a, 12b). Fur-
ther, we assume that the maximum inertia that each
agent can contribute is given by the stacked vector
µ = [20, 40, 60, 20, 40, 20, 40, 20, 40, 20, 20, 40, 60, 20, 40].
Note that the dissimilarity in the maximum inertia support can
arise due to nature of the underlying technology of the power
electronic interface, the size of the energy device, maximum
power rating among others. We recall from Section IV-B that
the bids and costs are expressed as non-decreasing convex
curves. Here, we consider a special subset of linear functions,
i.e., ck(µk) = ck µk for the costs. As the costs incurred for
provision of virtual inertia depend on the operating technology
[36], we divide the costs into three monetary categories 3 for
a qualitative analysis: low– (c = 1), medium– (c = 5), high–
(c = 10). The true cost vector for the agents is chosen as
csim = [1, 5, 1, 5, 5, 1, 5, 10, 5, 5, 5, 5, 10, 1, 5], where the csimk
element corresponds to the cost of procuring a unit inertia
from agent k. We summarize our observations below.
(i) In Figure 4, we plot the inertia profiles and the correspond-
ing worst-case performance for the three-region case study.
The robust optimal allocation problem yields a valley-filling
profile as in [7] which renders all buses identical with respect
to the expected disturbance.
(ii) In Figure 5, we compare the allocations and total pro-
curement costs for three mechanisms: a possible regulatory
allocation (where inertia is allocated proportionally to the
capacity of the virtual inertia devices µ, in order to meet the
specifications regardless of cost), market-based (Figure 2), and
the centralized (11) mechanism. Each allocation is such that
the performance requirements in (20) are met. The optimal
allocations and the costs for the centralized and market-based
mechanisms coincide. As the regulatory strategy does not
factor for the cost-curves of the agents, it results in a higher
overall cost.
(iii) Figure 6 plots the average VCG-based payments (payment
received per unit of virtual inertia) and average costs (cost per
3The costs indicate the trend and do not necessarily reflect the exact cost
of procurement.
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penalty and the associated worst-case performance.
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Fig. 6: Average payment and average cost profiles for agents partic-
ipating in the market-based auction for procuring virtual inertia.
unit of virtual inertia) for each agent. Note that the agents 2b,
4e, 8c, 12b do not provide any virtual inertia due to higher
per-unit cost of inertia. The average payment for each agent
providing virtual inertia support and connected to the same
node is identical. However, the cheapest agents are preferred–
this is reflected in payments larger than their costs (which is
also their bid). Ultimately, the utility (the difference between
payment and cost incurred) of each agent depends on the cost
curves of all the agents that are co-located at the same bus.
(iv) Another interesting observation is that the number of
agents do not necessarily determine the extent of influence
on pricing dynamics or market power, e.g., the agents 2a, 2c,
4c, 12a have the lowest cost of the service and yet they are not
utilised to their capacity µ. This is due to the fact that system
performance YD(m,pi) is both inertia and location dependent.
This therefore also rules out the concept of a single-clearing
price based on the cost and capacity.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We motivated the need for virtual inertia markets and
considered the problem of economic, incentivized procurement
of virtual inertia in low-inertia power grids. Two schemes for
virtual inertia procurement were introduced and analyzed via
an objective embedding a robust performance metric– account-
ing for grid stability and the cost of virtual inertia procurement.
In contrast to a regulatory approach, the proposed market-
based decentralized mechanism while respecting performance
constraints, adequately compensated the agents for their contri-
bution. Such a decentralized approach also resulted in a virtual
inertia allocation which maximized the social welfare of the
centralized planning problem. This mechanism was partially
inspired by the ancillary service markets and the payments to
agents were based on the VCG rule. This enforced truthful
bidding by the agents, achieved incentive compatibility, and
non-negative utilities. We finally presented a few illustrations
for a three-region case study underscoring the benefits of such
a mechanism, while highlighting the peculiarities such as the
absence of a single-clearing price, due to the heavy location-
dependence of inertia as a service.
With more renewable integration in the power grids, virtual
inertia is poised for a greater role, and the issues of economical
procurement and markets for this service will gain further
prominence. This paper is an attempt in this direction and we
believe that such decentralized auction mechanisms for virtual
inertia procurement will be integrated within the structure of
existing power markets. In addition, we wish to point out that
the decentralised mechanism presented here is model-agnostic.
Though we illustrate our approach through a stylistic swing
equation-based model, it can be extended to more complex
system dynamics as long as convexity of the objective is
established. Open problems not considered here pertain to
robust auction mechanisms which counteract shill-bidding and
collusion among various agents.
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APPENDIX
We present the proof sketch of Theorem 1 below.
Proof. In the following we use µ? as a shorthand for µVCG,
and µˆ as a shorthand for µVCG-k. We have from (14),
µ?(b) = arg min
µ∈M
B(µ, b), (22)
where, we recall that µ?(b)=µVCG(b) is a function of the bids
b = (bk, b−k).
As before, let µVCG-k be the vector of optimal allocations
of agents, when agent k abstains from the auction. We have,
µˆ(b) = arg min
µ∈M−k
B(µ, b), (23)
and µˆ(b)=µVCG-k(b) is a function of the bids (b−k).
The individual payment to each agent k as per the VCG
payment rule (16) is
pVCGk =
{
B(µˆ(b), b)
}
−
{
B(µ?(b), b)− bk(µ?k(b))
}
.
Each agent maximizes individual utility with the local
optimization problem for agent k as in (17). At the optimal
allocation (µVCG, pVCG), with bids (bk, b−k), the utility of
agent k is
uk(bk, b−k) = pVCGk (bk, b−k)− ck(µVCGk (bk, b−k)) (24)
= B(µˆ(b), b)−γ Γ(m(µ?(b)))−
∑
j 6=k
bj(µ
?
j (b))− ck(µ?k(b))︸ ︷︷ ︸
= −B(µ?(b), (ck, b−k))
.
(25)
We recall from (12) that m is a function of µ. Hence, we can
express m(µ?(b)) as a function of µ?(b). Furthermore, we
know from (17) that the agents desire to maximize individual
utilities through an optimal bidding strategy bk, preferably,
independent of b−k.
Note that the first term in (25), B(µˆ(b), b) is the objective
evaluated at the optimizer obtained in (23). Via the constraint
µk = 0 and bid characteristic bk(0) = 0, we conclude that
the term B(µˆ(b), b) is independent of (bk, µk). The utility
uk in (24) is therefore maximized when the second term
B(µ?(b), (ck, b−k)) attains a minimum. Let B?(µ?, (b†k, b−k))
be the minimum of B(µ?(b), (ck, b−k)), i.e.,
B? = min
bk
γ Γ(m(µ?(b))) +
∑
j 6=k
bj(µ
?
j (b)) + ck(µ
?
k(b)).
From (22), note that
B(µ?(bk, b−k), (bk, b−k)) = min
µ∈M
B(µ, (bk, b−k)). (26)
Therefore, by changing arguments from bk to ck we get
µ?(ck, b−k) = arg min
µ∈M
B(µ, (ck, b−k)), (27)
B(µ?(ck, b−k), (ck, b−k)) = min
µ∈M
B(µ, (ck, b−k)). (28)
From equations (26), (27), (28), and for the truthful bid
bk(µk) = ck(µk), the set µ?(b) = µ?(bk, b−k) is the min-
imizer of B(µ?(b), (ck, b−k)), with the minimum value of
B?(µ?, (b†k, b−k)) = B(µ?(ck, b−k), (ck, b−k)).
The above argument applies to each agent k. Hence, bidding
the true cost bk = ck is a dominant strategy, and thus also
a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, as this bid bk = ck, is
independent of the choice of the bids of other agents b−k,
such a mechanism is incentive-compatible.
The utility function of agent k when all agents bid true
costs, u?k(ck, c−k), is
u?k(ck, c−k) = B(µˆ(c), c)− B(µ?(c), c),
where c = (ck, c−k). As the first term B(µˆ(c), c) is evaluated
over a smaller constraint set M−k, it is always larger than or
equal to the second term B(µ?(c), c). Consequently, it follows
that bidding one’s true cost also results in non-negative utilities
u?k ≥ 0 and thus also non-negative payments pVCGk (c) ≥ 0
from (17). As each agent bids the true cost, the problems
(14) and (11) coincide. Hence, the optimal allocation µVCG(c)
minimizes the social cost in the centralized problem (11) and
maximizes social welfare. This completes the proof.
